

# On the Way to Global Ethics? Cosmopolitanism, 'Ethical' Selfhood and Otherness

Louiza Odysseos *SOAS, University of London*



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**ABSTRACT:** In response to varied processes of globalization, the cosmopolitan perspective has rightly insisted that discussion of global ethics ought to be taken seriously. This article agrees with cosmopolitan theorists in calling for the implementation of a perspective that can address the other outside of narrow communal determinations. Yet it also advances a critique of their reliance on legalist instruments such as human rights, contending that the bestowal of human rights does not necessarily or directly lead to an ethics of inclusiveness. While the attribution of universal humanity to all may appear as an appropriate means of extending ethical regardness to all others, this does not immediately follow from such a legalist gesture. Any attempts to articulate a truly *global* ethics must begin by questioning the distinct communal sensibilities which, by the very fact of their distinctiveness, always already contain within them a 'xenophobic' element that cannot be transcended solely by the bestowal of human rights or other such instruments. This article, therefore, discusses a different kind of 'cosmopolitan' disposition, one which is based on the recovery of an ethical selfhood that understands itself as an opening to otherness. For this task, it explores the phenomenological analyses of German philosopher Martin Heidegger and specifically his examination of how communication can be cultivated through hearing and silence.

**KEY WORDS:** *cosmopolitanism, ethics, Heidegger, human rights*

## Introduction

In response to the vertiginous processes of globalization, the perspective of cosmopolitanism has rightly considered that the discussion of global ethics ought to be taken seriously. For many cosmopolitan thinkers, the achievement of global ethics involves either the deprioritization of communal ethical bonds for those of a universal humanity, or the explicit grounding of ethical selfhood in

Contact address: Louiza Odysseos, Department of Political Studies, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG, UK.  
Email: [louiza.odysseos@soas.ac.uk](mailto:louiza.odysseos@soas.ac.uk)

one's universal humanity.<sup>1</sup> Following from this ethical understanding, the political project of cosmopolitanism, according to a recent formulation by Ulrich Beck, calls for the establishment of an order in which 'human rights precedes international law', which will be quite the reverse of the modern, statist order where 'international law (and the state) precedes human rights'.<sup>2</sup> Beck's programmatic statement seeks to bring about the denigration of distinctions, such as 'war and peace, domestic (policy) and foreign (policy)', which had supported the previous order known to the discipline of international relations as *international society*.<sup>3</sup> Beck advances a worldview in which 'individualization and globalization are directly related to each other' and which presupposes, it is suggested here, that law and morality ought to converge and be explicitly grounded on 'a legally binding world society of individuals'.<sup>4</sup> Such a paradigm shift would also entail changes in governance, such that the upholding and promulgation of human rights would not be the internal concern of the state (albeit being one of its sources of legitimacy), but would form the core of a cosmopolitan law backed by what one might call a 'cosmopolitan intervention regime'.

Yet how are human rights understood in the context of this cosmopolitan proposal? Should we conceive of them as the expression of an ethical cosmopolitan order which grounds political action? Or, should we regard them as the legal instruments of an emerging post-Westphalian order which can battle the outmoded morality of the bounded community from above? In other words, are we conceiving of global ethics as the ground, and reason for the enforcement, of a kind of cosmo-politics or are we seeking to establish a global ethical order through the instrument of human rights, expunged from its previous statist grounding? The debate on global ethics revolves around these questions and it is only appropriate that the status of global ethics as a *question* is maintained.

The importance of this debate, however, sometimes causes us to forget to ask a set of other equally crucial questions. Is the accordance of human rights to an increasingly globalized humanity sufficient to inaugurate a global ethics? Can we simply assume that global ethics can be grounded on a universal humanity, or in a different vein, that communal ethical bonds can be easily deprioritized or 'cosmopolitanized'? Might not global ethics require openness to the other, an openness which is not necessarily brought about through the bestowal of rights? Could it be that the internationalization of instruments such as human rights, with which one seeks to regulate morality, merely overlays such instruments on the structure of already existing communal *ethē*, that remain closed off to the other? This article suggests that cosmopolitan theorists are correct in calling for the implementation of a perspective that can address the other, the stranger or the *xenos*, outside of narrow communal determinations. Yet it simultaneously contends that the bestowal of human rights does not necessarily or directly lead to an ethics of inclusiveness; while the attribution of universal humanity to all may appear as an appropriate means of extending ethical regardness to all others, this does not immediately follow from such a legalist gesture. Any attempts to

articulate a truly *global* ethics must begin by reconsidering our distinct communal ethical sensibilities which, by the very fact of their distinctiveness, always already contain within them a 'xenophobic' element. Our sense of selfhood and identity arises from a local and particular public group, a 'community', such that openness to others requires cultivation. Rather than assuming that the ascription of rights is a sufficient path to global ethics, this article proposes an alternative path, which calls for openness to the other. Such openness to the other cannot come from the imposition of a cosmopolitan legalist perspective but requires a radical questioning to confront and expose the 'xenophobic' element inherent in communal *ethos*; that is, it has to be invoked within ethics, and ethical selfhood, itself. In this way, the articulation of a global ethics forms part of an existing *critique* against traditional understandings of ethics as moral codes, a critique animated by attestations of otherness and suffering that traditional ethics is said to occlude.

If ethics is considered to be 'the body of values by which a culture understands and interprets itself with regard to what is good and bad . . . a group of principles for both conduct and value judgement',<sup>5</sup> then the discursive creation of moral norms is shown to be inseparable from communal or local processes of socialization, habituation and normalization. It is through this connection between normalcy, normalization and *ethos* within everyday conceptions of ethics as moral rules that the occlusion of otherness occurs.<sup>6</sup> In the context of this article, this linkage between ethics and normalcy is discussed through the linguistic development of the word *ethos*, but it is, more importantly, supplemented by the phenomenological analysis of average everydayness found in the early writings of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger and, particularly, his seminal work *Being and Time*.<sup>7</sup> Through such an analysis of everydayness the article suggests that it is by calling our customary ethical practices into question that openness to the other can be cultivated and global ethics can be properly considered.

## Questioning Ethics

If by ethics we understand the emergence of a code or a set of norms expressive of locally acceptable and expected behaviour, then 'the possibility of ethical thought and action is found in traditional "normalcy" and its history'.<sup>8</sup> The reference to normalcy indicates that the construction of norms usually arises within habitual behaviour, which tends to have a normalization effect. People are socialized by adjusting their dealings in the world towards what becomes average practice through infinite and minute adjustments. It is through such socialization and normalization that 'norms' develop, in the sense that historical and local habitual practice tends to coalesce into customary ways of doing things.<sup>9</sup> Norms, then, are representative of current average practice, which is attained through processes of normalization of behaviour and the power of habituation.<sup>10</sup> As such, they are undeniably public.

Some of these practices also ascend to the level of moral rules, which normally

refer to locally desirable ways to regulate action towards others and the collectivity in general. That such a body of rules exists, however, need not involve the explicit individual choice of those specific rules as such, nor does it signify each individual's conscious agreement to obey them. On the contrary, the everyday value judgements and moral acts of members of society involves recourse to such rules without reflexive choice (BT, 164–5). Moral rules derive from acceptable and desirable practices; indeed they are called 'moral' because they have historically been accorded value within a locally specific public group. Some of these rules might have been gradually and/or officially codified.<sup>11</sup> This connection between expected behaviour and ethics can still hold even in references to 'universal ethics', which can be seen as the universalization of rules arising within a particular public group.

A linguistic excursion might help to illustrate the relationship between the customary and the moral, as well as the transition from one to the other. Charles Chamberlain's research in this area shows how in the 5th century BC, the word *éthos* can usually be understood and translated as "character" but that this was not true in the case of earlier writers; on the contrary, the term had the prior signification of 'animal haunts' or 'dwellings' and is usually found in its plural form, *éthea*.<sup>12</sup> Gradually the term became commonly used regarding humans and came to mean 'the arena in which people or animals move; further, this essence, whether in an animal or a human being, resists the imposition of outside influences'.<sup>13</sup> Similarly for Charles Scott, *ethos* has to do with customary dwelling and the behaviour or manners which one exhibits in such a homestead. In *ethos* one finds a particularist drive which encompasses its own 'ordering, identity-giving, and nurturing force'; *ethea*, then, were places of belonging but the term connoted a certain disposition to recalcitrance and resistance to 'civilizing' influence.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, it can be established that the term, where it referred to humans, initially did so to barbarians (such as Persians), indicating that these 'are subject to a principle of order, a *logos* all their own . . . off the scale of "normal" – that is, Greek – expectations'.<sup>15</sup>

In the 4th century BC, the term's meaning as a place of belonging was configured and *ethos* became located in the soul, and was occasionally used in conjunction with *tropos* (way or manner). It is from this configuration that the connection to 'character' develops as that which evidences one's manners. The 'spatial' sense of the term persists, however, and 'now refers to the peculiar characteristics which citizens of a *polis* acquire as part of their civic heritage . . . *ta éthé* in particular are often mentioned in connection with *trep hó* and *paideuó*, that is, with the socialization of children'.<sup>16</sup> Customary habits become gradually codified into rules and laws, that is, *nómos*. *Nómos*, which means 'both law and melody', can be seen as the movement to codify into standardized rules, and perhaps promulgate, that which belongs to a particular habitual order.<sup>17</sup> *Nómos*, then, raises particular manners to the level of principles, by which also the recalcitrant *ethea* are 'civilized'. The movement towards codification and ordering, in this regard, necessarily involves

struggle between free and differentiated habituation on the one hand, and the desire to impose an external but principled order, on the other. *Ethos*, then, derived from the Indo-European *Swedh*, means 'one's own', both a person's character and the way 'we are of our own' as a distinct group: *ethos* nurtures, socializes and provides the identificatory processes by which one is one's own self.<sup>18</sup>

What is more, the connection between customary ways of life and ethics is ever-evolving through infinitesimal changes, a process which is historically bounded and undeniably local. One cannot but perceive 'of laws and principles for thought and action as regional, as a group of claims characteristic of one cultural and historical segment'.<sup>19</sup> The derivation of the term 'ethics' from *ethos*, from customary ways of life, does not refer only to mores of small secluded communities, tribes of anthropological interest or imagined 'closed' cultural groups. It could similarly refer to 'western culture', 'western civilization' or 'European *ethos*' as a historically enlarged group with its specific ways of being. In this light, the norms, rules and ethical practices normally associated with 'the West', as well as the legal manifestations of these rules, such as human rights, are shown to be situated in processes of habituation and socialization of this public group or culture, despite their universalist aspirations. When the insights of the linguistic development of the term ethics are allowed to inform ethical inquiry, the universality of such norms is called into question.

The particular location and basis of ethical codification and construction in customary ways of behaving brings to the fore the relation between ethics and habituation, and recalls Martin Heidegger's discussion of average everydayness as the initial and primary way in which the existing self, which he called 'Dasein', finds itself as Being-in-the-world.<sup>20</sup> The historical development of the term *ethos* as a behaviour characteristic of a habitual dwelling place underlies the analysis of how the existing self is embedded in the world. Communal ethos is constitutive of the sense (meaning) and norms by which the self lives. The existing self has no essence for Heidegger; rather it is groundless, an amalgam of 'shared practices' and, as such, finds itself in a world already infused with sense already created and only partly authored by its own practices.<sup>21</sup> Hence, the existing self can be understood as *thrown* into a world through its dealings with available entities (such as tools) and its concern towards other selves; this thrownness is indicative of an existential heteronomy, a term which signifies its constitution by and reliance on others in its world.

Usually, however, the intelligibility which Dasein has within its public group is average and restricts Dasein's modes of relating to other entities. Conditioned through the practices and norms of what Heidegger called the 'they',<sup>22</sup> Dasein relates to other entities and other Daseins as merely 'occurrent' or present (what Heidegger calls present-at-hand).<sup>23</sup> This is particularly problematic for a discussion of ethics because this 'misperception' does not disclose entities in their Being but rather as manifested presence. Inasmuch as something or someone is accorded ethical significance, it requires the assignment of 'value' as the expression of posi-

tivity.<sup>24</sup> As regards itself, moreover, the self is ignorant of its heteronomy and entertains conceptions of autonomous selfhood and action free from constraint, bestowed upon it by an assumed innate autonomy. This average kind of comportment and intelligibility leads to a 'levelling-down' of its own possibilities for Being, but also involves a lack of recognition of this levelling-down and a flight from its own anxious ability-to-be. Insofar as morality enables this flight away from one's becoming-proper by socializing the self within its group, it keeps it within this average and constricting level of interaction. For Heidegger, then, 'ethics' encloses the self in commonplace and average comportment. The moral subject is, despite its purported autonomy, the subject of averageness, publicness and conformism, unquestioningly remaining within 'traditional' and customary bounds of behaviour.<sup>25</sup> Morality, therefore, is part of the 'average' intelligibility through which the world and beings within the world are disclosed.

This brief discussion of ethics has a number of implications for ethical universalism both for the discipline of international relations and for the international political practices of states and institutions. The questioning of ethics, as contained within a prevalent communal *ethos*, enables a contextualization of scholarly ethical work within its particularist location, which in the case of international relations scholarship is mostly western.<sup>26</sup> This 'locating' contests its universal claims and reveals its situated roots.<sup>27</sup> Seen in this light, the aspirations of universalist or cosmopolitan ethics are disclosed as particularist drives of socialization which seek to spread beyond their particularity. Yet, despite the discussion generated by the well-rehearsed charge of 'imperialism', it should not be the primary reason why global ethics cannot merely assume a universal perspective from the start. Rather, the hesitation to follow the universal path to global ethics must come from questioning whether such universality leads to an ethics that is attuned to the other, enabling an openness that transcends the legal aspect of cohabitation. Indeed, a global ethics that is open to the other requires precisely the calling into question *both* of one's embedded particular ethical practices *and* also of the very claim of their universality. Therefore, no matter how valuable such universalism is considered to be for the international and global concerns that the discipline of international relations and global actors wish to address, such 'locating' as undertaken above suggests that universalized customary norms and rules are not the ideal response to these concerns. Openness to the other might be found in a different kind of 'cosmopolitan' disposition.

## Turning Away from Ethics

To call its ethics into question, based on the group *ethos* as these are, the self must confront its customary practices and their assigned values, no matter how nurturing and comforting they may be, or how much value has been previously accorded to them. Such a critical re-evaluation of ethics, however, is hard to

pursue because of three distinct but related difficulties. The first is that such questioning is checked by the power of habituation. Since it challenges that which has been most revered by a particular culture or society, '[w]e cannot believe that our recognition of wrong, our commitment to right, our worship of God, our love of just laws, and our respect for human beings have as part of their fabric the inevitability of what we most abhor'.<sup>28</sup> Leaving 'what we most abhor' for later consideration, it should be noted that what is required in such a turning away from ethics is not to proclaim that this or that rule is faulty, or that another may be better suited to the moral judgement at hand. Rather, the notion of 'value' must itself be brought under scrutiny since it contributes, through its assignment, to the concealment of our average intelligibility and ways of behaving towards other entities. The habitual practice and obedience to communal moral norms misleads the self into believing that it is morally dutiful, while failing to ensure that one's ethos is open to the other.

A second difficulty is related to the assumption of sovereign subjectivity mentioned briefly.<sup>29</sup> The rupture involved in the calling of ethics into question, brings the self face-to-face with the impropriety (or inauthenticity) of its average everydayness: turning away from ethics 'is nothing less than a twisting free of a body of selfhood that is given in its investment in not knowing its being or its propriety vis-à-vis its being'.<sup>30</sup> The interruption of ethics arrests one's self-conception as autonomous subject and throws it back into anxiety by reminding it that it is the entity whose Being is an issue for it. Having no definite and determinate substance or nature, the self is called to itself by 'being called to a being whose meaning is mortal temporality and thus has no intrinsic, determinate meaning at all'.<sup>31</sup> Questioning ethics, then, is inseparable from reflecting on the subjectivity that the self posits for itself and the relation that ethics has in sustaining it. The indeterminacy and contingency of Dasein's Being reveals ethical norms and rules to be the ossification of a communal and shared web of rules for a being it wills itself to be in its flight from its radical contingency.<sup>32</sup>

The final and most important difficulty arises from the realization that, for all our rules and, what is worse, *because* of them, we have permitted and covered up that against which we purport to construct all moral rules: suffering.<sup>33</sup> Enclosed within the public group, the self comports itself ambiguously towards the world and, prompted by curiosity, it moves from one topic of interest to another without relating to entities in a way that would let them be in their Being. Moreover, average concern reduces communicating to 'idle talk' and treats other entities as merely present in the world, occluding in this way the paramount role of others and otherness for the self's constitution. Morally secure within communal norms and sets of rules set out according to the Being it believes it is, the self drowns out its anxiety in the volume of idle talk and the speed of its curiosity. Avoiding anxiety makes its own 'suffering' invisible: the truly other, then, is that which is most familiar, that is, itself. The invisibility of anxiety reduces suffering to the occurrent, the recognizable, 'real violence', as it were. Other people are also

reduced to presence and rendered voiceless in the endless transmission of things of interest. Additionally, the non-communal other, and his suffering, remains inaudible.

Questioning ethics, therefore, reveals a tension between the affirmative nurturing and socialization provided by one's own *ethos* on the one hand, and that which the *ethos* makes inaudible, namely, the suffering and the very voice of the other. Ethics, located within normal and habitual behaviour, is deaf to the suffering and voice both of alterity and of the self's radically contingent existence. In this way, '[t]he interruption of ethics provides an opening to hear what is inaudible in our *ethos*'.<sup>34</sup> Is there a way to hear the other embedded within the communal *ethos*; how does one find a way to render his/her *ethos* open to the voice of the other? Can suffering be made audible without an isolation from one's own group and customs? How, moreover, can the self's own anxiety be acknowledged? In other words, how can an ethical self, which understands itself as an opening to otherness, be recovered without a severance from its identity-giving *ethos*?<sup>35</sup>

## Hearing and Silence: The 'Conditions of Audibility'

Calling one's communal *ethos* into question, it has been suggested, might create an opening for Dasein to confront the 'xenophobic' attitude at the origin of its *ethos* and its ethical constructions, and, in this way, to hear the other's voice and confront its own suffering. How might everyday morality be questioned, however? The everyday shared practices, which Heidegger called the 'they', absorb and nurture the self. At the same time, however, such absorption also affects the self's openness both to the other and to its own existential otherness. Even if we conceive of being called away from the morality and habitual practices of the particular public group to which we belong, this still does not address the question of how the self can *hear* such a call. Even if the other calls to us, is not the problem the inability of the self to recognize *both* itself as immersed in the normative structures of the community *and* the exclusion of the other which this entails? Being called to question one's *ethos* is not *in itself* sufficient to rouse the self from its absorption. Therefore, it is necessary to ask about the 'conditions of audibility'<sup>36</sup> of the other and to reflect on how they might be achieved. This article suggests that the ability to hear, and the very conditions of audibility, have to be understood as a stepping away from the 'idle talk' of the public group into silence.

In what way, then, can the 'conditions of audibility' be improved and how could the transformative process begin by which one's own *ethos* might open up to otherness and suffering? Is all that is required 'a simple ontological [or otological?] operation, a small puncture through Dasein's ears so that it could for a moment at least escape the deafening sounds of "they" drowning out the question of (its) Being'?<sup>37</sup>

In *Being and Time* Heidegger traced such a possibility to the existential structure of discourse. 'Hearing is constitutive for discourse', he noted, because the

ability to listen discloses authentically that the existing self is Being-with others (BT, 206). Having more than a disclosive function, moreover, “[l]istening to . . . is Dasein’s existential way of *Being-open* as Being-with for Others’ (BT, 206; emphasis added). ‘Da-sein hears because it understands. As being-in-the-world that understands, with the others, it “listens to” itself and to *Mitda-sein*, and in this listening it belongs to these.’<sup>38</sup> Hearing is an aspect of the self’s attuned understanding that serves to highlight its state of being thrown into the world (*Geworfenheit*). For Heidegger, solipsism is an ontological impossibility because the self is born into discursive relations, so to speak, but it is specifically ‘listening to’ which enhances the coexistential character of existence. Indeed, ‘Being-with develops in listening to another’ (BT, 206). The self’s heteronomous constitution is made concrete through hearing; in other words, the self lives according to its heteronomy when it listens to the other. When ‘Dasein is, or rather exists, *hearingly*’ it is brought into communion with itself as Being-with.<sup>39</sup>

How can the ‘conditions of audibility’ be created? The possibility for hearing is related to keeping silent, because silence ‘is another essential possibility for discourse’ (BT, 208). Indeed, Miguel de Bestegui argues, silence ‘seems to occupy a . . . privileged position’ in Heidegger’s thought, and is regarded as a pivotal link in the relationship between discourse and otherness.<sup>40</sup> ‘In talking with one another, the person who keeps silent can “make one understand” (that is he can develop an understanding) and he can do so more authentically than the person who is never short of words’ (BT, 208). Therefore, ‘[k]eeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing’ because ‘[t]o be able to keep silent, Dasein must have something to say – that is, it must have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosure of itself’ (BT, 208). In this way, silence cannot be associated with an inability to speak, or be considered ‘a negation nor a privation’; on the contrary, silence should be thought of as ‘a positive possibility, indeed speech in the most proper sense’.<sup>41</sup> As with hearing, with which silence is aligned, ‘silence is essentially *Mitteilung*, communicating and sharing’, because ‘[i]n silence, Dasein has an ear for the Other, it is “all ears,” as it were’.<sup>42</sup>

As a constitutive part of discourse (*logos*), hearing belongs to everyday comportment in the world; yet, through hearing, ‘Dasein is open, disclosed to itself, to the world and to others in the most authentic way’.<sup>43</sup> Hearing, then, ‘constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being – *as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with-it*’ (BT, 206; emphasis added). This is an extremely important passage as it is the only one in *Being and Time* that makes this explicit reference to the other-as-friend, carried within, carried as otherness in the mode of a voice, ‘a purely phonic presence’.<sup>44</sup> Such a ‘phonic presence’ is not uncanny or ghostlike but ought to be understood as constitutive for Dasein as a speaking being. As Jacques Derrida remarks, ‘[t]his voice is an essentially understandable voice, the possibility of speech or discourse’.<sup>45</sup>

The sort of presence invoked in Heidegger’s quote is not representational in

the pure sense of the word. 'Through its voice that I hear, I hear the friend itself, beyond its voice but in that voice'; it is almost an echo of Dasein's withness, where 'I hear and carry the friend with me in hearing its voice . . . Dasein carries it, one might say, in the figure of its voice, its metonymic figure (a part of the whole)'.<sup>46</sup> It is a reminder that otherness is not external, as that from which Dasein distinguishes itself. Dasein has no choice with regards to its relation to otherness because, as Being-with, Dasein carries its otherness within it. This discussion of otherness and the facilitating role of hearing/silence oppose subjectivist understandings of relations as *voluntary*: relations can only be taken as voluntary on the basis of an ontological account of subjectivity which denies and obliterates Dasein's heteronomy, its constitution by otherness, and which refutes the other's constitutive role in Dasein's world.

The other-as-friend, whose voice Dasein carries within it, is the specificity of this otherness, while at the same time it is Dasein being made aware of the internalization of otherness. 'What defines "the voice of the friend," then, is not a quality, the friendly characteristic, but a belonging.'<sup>47</sup> In this regard, the belonging says more about the constitution of Dasein, its internal relation to otherness that is part and parcel of its thrownness, than about the friend, who is there as a voice to be heard without choice within Dasein:

Through its voice, Dasein carries the friend with it, whether it wishes to or not, whether it knows it or not, and whatever its resolution. In any case, what matters here is not what the friend's voice says, not its said, not even the saying of its said. Hardly its voice. Rather what matters is the hearing (*das Hören*) of its voice.<sup>48</sup>

The ear to which the hearing refers, however, does not point to the organ 'ear' but alludes instead to 'the ear of and for one's self', attuned not to some inner life but the disclosedness of Dasein as projected outward and ahead of itself, 'its very ek-sistence'.<sup>49</sup> It is what renders the familiarity of one's own 'self' strange. It is significant for becoming-proper that the voice, which Dasein carries within it, is the voice of the other-as-friend: 'this hearing could not open Dasein "to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being," if hearing were not first the hearing of this voice, the exemplary metonymy of the friend that each Dasein bears close to itself (*bei sich trägt*)'.<sup>50</sup> Beistegui, too, insists that propriety and silence are related because 'silencing reveals existence to itself, a call that can be heard only in the withdrawal of language'.<sup>51</sup>

Derrida's earlier claim that what is significant for the 'conditions of audibility' is the act of hearing, rather than the actual content of the other's voice, touches on two important concerns. First, it helps to dispel the assumption that listening to the other has only positive connotations. As Heidegger explains, hearing 'can be done in several possible ways: following, going along with, and the privative modes of not-hearing, resisting, defying, and turning away' (*BT*, 206–7). Similarly, it cannot be assumed that the voice of the other is a priori positive, as Derrida confirms: '[t]he voice is not friendly, first because it is the voice of a friend, of

someone, of another Dasein responding to the question “who?”<sup>52</sup> And yet, this is embedded in a different kind of positivity, which pertains to all modes of hearing. The incessant relation between discourse, hearing and otherness encompasses opposition, resistance and the possibility of turning away: as Derrida suggests, ‘there is no essential opposition between *philein* and *Kampf*’.<sup>53</sup> The negative modes could still determine the hearing of the voice of the friend. To be opposed to the friend, to turn away from it, to defy it, to not hear it, that is still to hear and keep it, to carry with self, *sich bei tragen*, the voice of the friend.<sup>54</sup>

The second concern revolves around the question of how exemplary the figure of the friend is. As Derrida notes, the crucial question is whether the friend is used in those passages as any other interchangeable example (why not sister, brother, father, asks Derrida) or whether the concept of the friend is in itself crucial to audibility and propriety. Could it be possible that,

... exemplarity functions here in another sense, not in the sense of an example among other possible examples but of the exemplarity that gives to be read and carries in itself *all* the figures of *Mitdasein* [Being-with] as *Aufeinander-bören* [listening to one another]? All the figures of *Mitsein* would be figures of the friend, even if they were secondarily unfriendly or indifferent.<sup>55</sup>

Taking exemplarity in this exceptional way, understood not as interchangeable but as emblematic, suggests that the existential presence of the voice of ‘the friend’ is indicative of the possibility of a transformation of Dasein’s selfhood and comportment to its world. This is a crucial and much-debated point which centres on the complex issue of Dasein’s constitution as a self. As noted, the self is constituted through and through by otherness in that its world is a web of meanings, assignments and norms largely constructed by its community. It is this absorption into the ‘they’, into otherness, which prompted Heidegger to suggest that the answer to the question ‘who is Dasein?’ is not ‘I’ but the ‘they’ (and, as such, inauthentic). Yet such immersion is not equivalent to openness to the other because the ‘they’ perpetuates a discourse of autonomy and sovereignty of the individual, obstructing in this way Dasein’s understanding of itself as constituted by others. Hence, although embedded through and through in the ‘they’, Dasein considers itself autonomous and sovereign. The example of the friend indicates that the possibility for openness exists within this heteronomy; selfhood manifests itself as heteronomous and at the same time open to the other under conditions of silence and genuine hearing. By choosing to listen less to the idle talk of individuality sustained by the ‘they’, Dasein radically questions itself, and begins to hear the voice of heteronomy, i.e. of the other within. *It is on the basis of this self-understanding that the concrete other can also be heard.* In the absence of a radical questioning about one’s selfhood and the role of otherness within the self, any others in the world will be heard within the contours of communal *ethos*, by the rules and norms of customary practice without a question of how it is that they are implicated in our self-constitution.<sup>56</sup>

In the space created by silence and hearing there is a possibility of reformulating the *ethos* of the ‘they’ so that it is open to otherness, to the internal and permanent recollection of the voice of the friend, which Dasein carries with it. ‘[B]y developing what one could call an ontology of friendship or an ontophilology, Heidegger seems to provide a space for a rethinking of ethics.’<sup>57</sup> Silence ‘makes dangerous the values by which we give ourselves common lives and establish the rules within which we are constituted’, and instigates the questioning of morality.<sup>58</sup> In the wider silence of Being/time Dasein’s ‘reticence [*Verschwiegenheit*] makes something manifest, and does away with “idle talk”’ (*BT*, 208). Thus, ‘[h]earing in this silence [of Being/time] is finding oneself in the *question* of ethics’.<sup>59</sup>

The above exploration suggests that the voice of the friend, exemplary of otherness, is carried within the self. However, the self’s flight from the most fundamental otherness, its own, renders it deaf to the cry of the other. The ‘conditions of audibility’ might be enhanced when ‘idle talk’ (*Gerede*) is interrupted; in the space of this suspension, there is silence, in which the voice of the other calls Dasein into question and is heard. Heard in silence, the voice is a genuine communication and enables a ‘wrenching motion’, by which Dasein recoils from its inauthentic practices and ‘puts itself in question by the values that it holds’.<sup>60</sup>

## Recovering the Ethical Self

To find oneself in the ‘question of ethics’, to use Scott’s phrase, is to attempt a recovery of the ‘ethical’ self, which is open to itself as strange and to the voice of the other as always within it. Therefore, calling one’s communal ethos into question is part and parcel of the process which Heidegger calls authenticity (or more appropriately, ‘becoming-proper’) which is tantamount to becoming-other or strange to oneself. This estrangement leads to a self-relationship where the self relates to itself as other, as strange; otherness is what the self becomes. Propriety then, is not necessarily moral perfectionism but rather indicative of the struggle with one’s self towards a *modification* of one’s impropriety.<sup>61</sup> Once this process is set into motion, the self’s heteronomy is made apparent to it, enhancing in this way the possibility of listening to ‘the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with-it’ (*BT*, 206). There is no *choice* to hear otherness once one embarks on this process of self-estrangement.<sup>62</sup> The process of attaining this ‘ethical’ kind of selfhood is not universal but unique to each struggle, its achievement is never assured or static; we cannot phenomenally speak of ‘completion’ because what is defining of authenticity is the effort to achieve it.<sup>63</sup> Walter Davis argues that the struggle, the ceaseless movement towards propriety, can be thought of as ‘the “ethical” relationship one is living toward oneself’.<sup>64</sup> Thus, ‘the ethical’ is not universal; on the contrary, it is particularist because it refers to ‘the primary relationship which underlies all the positions and attitudes one adopts toward the world’.<sup>65</sup> How one relates to others on the basis of this self-relationship is not

given in advance nor can it be collectively dictated since this would mean a fall into the public and habitual practices that are indicative of one's *ethos*. Yet, in the absence of the relationship one resolutely assumes towards one's own existence, it is impossible to have any appropriate relationship towards others.

Of course, it can be argued that this self-relationship is not ethical in any common sense of the word but ontological. In the 'Letter on Humanism', Heidegger refers to ethics as dwelling in the nearness of Being.<sup>66</sup> The term *ethos* is modified with propriety in mind so that it now:

. . . means abode, dwelling place. The word names the open region in which the human being dwells. The open region of his abode allows what pertains to the essence of the human being, and what in thus arriving resides in nearness to him, to appear.<sup>67</sup>

There might be an intimate relationship, therefore, between 'propriety' and something like 'ethicity', which is, according to Derrida, that which makes ethics 'ethical'.<sup>68</sup> The movement to propriety is 'ethical', then, in the sense that it indicates a struggle expressive of a self-relationship which brings Dasein to reside closer to its Being. In this way, Dasein's genuine appropriation of its heteronomous existence, the relationship it sustains with itself, might be compared to Michel Foucault's Heidegger-inspired ethics as 'a practice; ethos is a manner of being'.<sup>69</sup> The ethical self, then, would embody its propriety towards its finite being as a *techne tou biou*, or a technology of the self.<sup>70</sup> Only on the *ground* of such a self-relationship can an 'ethical' attitude arise towards other beings.

## **Rethinking the Need for Rules of Proper Conduct**

The previous section discussed the creation of the 'conditions of audibility' through the cultivation of silence and hearing. To be silent, it was suggested, is to enable genuine discourse; it is to be able to hear the voice of otherness within. Such an internal, 'phonic presence' brings to the fore the self's heteronomy and initiates a process of questioning, which is expressive of a one's ethical self-relationship. The recovery of the 'ethical' self, it was mentioned above, refers to the 'ethicity of propriety', where propriety is the self-relationship, which enables the self to take up its heteronomy properly, and to hear the voice of otherness that it carries within it. How might such a recovery facilitate our discussion of global ethics? Does it necessitate the relinquishment of the construction of ethical rules as inauthentic, as a remnant of a subjectivist ontology? Could not the 'ethicity of propriety' form the basis for minimalist ethical construction that could join with cosmopolitan discourse in its search for global ethical norms and rules (if not necessarily the codification of such rules in international law, as is Beck's suggestion)? This possibility of utilizing the recovery of the 'ethical' self as a ground for ethical construction is examined next.

## On the Impossibility of a Renewed Ethical Foundationalism

It will be recalled that there is a tension between the affirmative nurturing associated with the socialization processes of a communal *ethos* and the impropriety of the average intelligibility, in which these processes result, so that the voice of the outsider and of the self's own anxiety in the face of its own Being become inaudible. One cannot 'do away' with *ethos*, since the averageness it generates is constitutive of the totality of meaning in which the self orients its existence. Socialization is intimately connected to 'belonging', as Jean-Luc Nancy notes, and 'there is nothing sentimental, domestic, or "community-oriented" about wanting to say we. It is existence reclaiming its due or its condition: co-existence'.<sup>71</sup> Acknowledging that universal ethical rules are embedded in a communal *ethos*, Scott wonders, however, whether it would be possible to maintain 'a limited field of nurturance . . . a structure that shows itself differently, that shows itself to be outside time and outside ethnic suspicions and conservative provinciality' and, at the same time, delineate on the basis of it 'a field of laws and principles, that brings with it, into time, indications, more than hints, but patterns that point to a transtemporal circumscription of the writhing, belligerent interplay of *etbea*'.<sup>72</sup> Is it possible to call for and successfully bring into the universal certain indications of how to interact among multiple *etbea*? Such a field of nurturing would effectively maintain the identity-giving and norm-creating characteristics of the local while, at the same time, attempting to provide a minimalist set of principles that would restrain the *ethos*'s resistance to otherness and render it open to the influence and voice of alterity. Three related arguments are examined as to the impossibility of renewing a universalism 'grounded' on the recovery of the 'ethical' self.

A first argument would be to recall the conditions under which universalism might be possible, and specifically, its connection to foundationalism. For Hermann Philipse, such a suggestion for minimal 'indications' for ethical conduct can be taken as another 'stage in the historical development of ethical foundationalism'.<sup>73</sup> If this is indeed so, what is the ultimate ground on which these principles would be based, and does not such a search for foundation, in and of itself, 'lead to an infinite regress unless there are first principles of ethics that are so secure that further justification is not needed'?<sup>74</sup> If one contests, therefore, the 'idea that there is a supreme moral truth from which rules of conduct could be deduced', then universalism becomes untenable.<sup>75</sup> Andrew Linklater has recently suggested, from an 'unshamedly' universalist position, that 'the possibility of occupying an Archimedean standpoint which permits objective knowledge of permanent moral truths which bind the whole of humanity is a claim' that not only has been repeatedly contested but that contemporary theorists 'are correct to deny'.<sup>76</sup> Yet surely Scott's call for the introduction of minimalist indications is not a suggestion that a secure foundation exists. Could, however, the recovery of the

‘ethical’ self, which understands itself as an opening to otherness, serve as this ‘groundless’ ground? Could, in other words, the ‘ethical’ self-relationship one discovers in silence be seen as a foundation for the universal construction of rules? The answer is most likely negative, since it would require that the existing self be ascribed a substantive essence, the impossibility of which is made evident when one recalls the radical contingency of its existence and its groundlessness in the discussions of Being-towards-death and anxiety that Heidegger undertakes in *Being and Time*.<sup>77</sup>

The essence of the self’s propriety is not permanence, but an abyssal structure which can never act as a ground. As Derrida enigmatically notes, ‘in such a structure, which is a non-fundamental one, at once superficial and bottomless, still and always “flat,” the proper-ty (*propre*) is sunk’.<sup>78</sup> The self’s groundlessness arrests the foundationalist drive from instantiating itself in an ultimate ground: this could only be one’s self-relationship, the content of which is that Dasein *has* no ground and in becoming proper, it comes to terms with this groundlessness and into communion with itself as strange. What the self has, rather, is a disposition towards itself (it is ready for anxiety) and concern towards others. As such, it cannot form the foundation that this kind of ethical construction requires. ‘Nothing would be more violent or naive’, writes Derrida, ‘than to call for more frontality, more thesis or more thematization, to suppose that one can find a standard *here*’.<sup>79</sup> The ‘ethical’ self, engaged in the struggle for propriety, is not an *answer* in the form of a ground, but an *awareness* that it is itself *questionable*, that its Being is a question for it.

Finally, universalizing the insights gained in the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self is also rendered untenable when one considers that:

... ontology can provide ethics ... only with formal indications of the general characteristics of human existence. In turn, the practical disciplines can be of help to human action only indirectly by providing a rough outline of the practical sphere in question that has to be interpretively concretized in the historical situation of one’s own existence.<sup>80</sup>

The role of fundamental ontology is not to dictate explicitly how one ought to act by constructing ethical rules, rather it ‘frees the individual for his self-reflection’.<sup>81</sup> When, just after the Second World War, Jean Beaufret asked Heidegger why he had hesitated in constructing an ethics, Heidegger’s reply could only be that ‘the question was essentially unanswerable’.<sup>82</sup> The responsibility of philosophy was to induce thinking, but not to impose restrictions or conditions, as if these were generalizable to each and every factual (particular) situation. As Hans-Georg Gadamer notes:

... [h]ow can it be the task of a philosopher to construe an ethical system that proposes or prescribes a social order or recommends a new way of molding morals or general public convictions about concrete matters?<sup>83</sup>

Ethical judgements can only be taken on the basis of the factual situation and its

specificity. Moreover, as was noted with the examination of *ethos*, ethical norms 'involve processes of human learning and socialization that are already under way, forming an *ethos*, long before people ever confront the radical questions associated with philosophy. "Ethics" presupposes a lived system of values'.<sup>84</sup> Whatever assistance on how to live one's life ethics might desire to provide, it can never replace reflection about and *in* the factual situation by which already existing rules of conduct are interpreted. To answer the *question* of ethics with, even a minimalist, codified morality is to ignore that codification can only be understood as embedded and socialized into a group *ethos* which resists the 'imposition of outside influences' or at best interprets them on the ground of its *ethos*. To claim that rule-making could lie outside one's own *ethos*, outside of a historical and factual situation, would be to assert that morality requires a kind of reasoning based on logic of which everyone is capable.<sup>85</sup> It is to suggest that reasoning is not embedded within local practices but is universal, yet this might indicate an ethnocentric outlook disguised as universalism.<sup>86</sup> It is not possible to encompass universal ethical construction in a philosophy of the limit, such as Heidegger's phenomenology of *Dasein*, which recognizes not only the facts of cultural relativity but that an ahistorical and foundational approach towards proper conduct cannot but fail to do what it is intended to achieve: make the other's voice audible and act in ways which do not occlude the heteronomous facticity of existence.

The impossibility of a renewed universalism, however, brings into relief that what currently exists is but 'an urgent *plea* for a universal morality'.<sup>87</sup> Yet, it is questionable whether a set of universal principles could, indeed, bring about a transformation of local *ethe* and provide a design for inter-ethical interaction. There is no assurance that what has been inaudible in one's *ethos* will not be equally or more starkly so if voiced in ways not able to be captured or accommodated by codified norms. The preceding discussion considered that the 'ethical' self cannot provide the new foundationalism nor can its comportment within the factual situation be universalized. Such a refusal, however, is not tantamount to a denial of the need or possibility of a 'global ethics' but a suggestion that global ethics might lie in a *disposition* or *sensibility* towards the other, which the 'ethical' self can espouse. This disposition is tied to openness and audibility, as already suggested, but it will be discussed in greater detail below.

## **On the Way to Global Ethics: A Different Kind of Cosmopolitanism**

While the desirability of a global ethics is easily attested to in this global era, this article has suggested that perhaps such a global ethics might have little to do with the universalization of rules or indications for conduct, given the difficulties which arise from the universalism of such rules and the impossibility of a renewed foundationalism. Nevertheless, a mediation amongst 'belligerent *ethea*', which ethical construction wishes to restrain, is still desirable in a world of value plural-

ity and inter-communal conflict. As was noted, the notion of the 'ethical' self proposed can be understood as an opening to alterity which constitutes the very 'ethnicity' of any ethics. The self's openness comes from seeing that its ground is nothingness and that no other transcendence exists but a plunge towards the world in which it is amid others and other-mediated meanings. Becoming-proper is a constant recovery of its world as relational totality, within which relationships with others become re-evaluated in their own facticity and thrownness. The recovery of silence and hearing, resulting from the questioning of communal *ethos*, brings Dasein to face itself as 'singularity of the self that knows itself as opening to alterity',<sup>88</sup> a knowledge which arises from an awareness of itself as other. 'Singularity . . . installs relation as the withdrawal of identity, and communication as the withdrawal of communion', insists Jean-Luc Nancy.<sup>89</sup>

The ontological disposition associated with the 'ethical' self suggests 'that human being can be thought in terms of the clearing or space it makes for Being, for world, for the realms and regimes of "truth" or manifestness, for the plurality of cultures'.<sup>90</sup> Such a disposition attests to the desire for a different kind of cosmopolitanism, one associated with openness to, and concern for, the other. This disposition is none other than what Heidegger called 'liberating' concern.<sup>91</sup> Liberating concern is, according to Heidegger, one of the two radical manifestations of concern that Dasein can have towards the other. In addition to privative forms of concern (such as indifference, not caring, neglect), concern might take the form of displacing the other. This is a situation when Dasein's concern 'take[s] away "care" from the Other and puts itself in his position in concern: it can *leap in* for him' (*BT*, 158). Although expressive of care for the other, this kind of concern does not facilitate the process by which the other uniquely appropriates its shared world and confronts its own radical contingency and groundlessness. *Liberating* concern, however, 'pertains essentially to authentic care – that is to the existence of the other . . . it helps the other to become transparent to himself *in* his care and to become *free for* it' (*BT*, 159). Only the concern which 'leaps forth and liberates' allows the other to embark on her own struggle and become-proper. Through this proper kind of relating 'I call the other to face his own anxious self-responsibility'.<sup>92</sup> It is important to note, however, that liberating concern does not only assist the other to face her own selfhood and open up to the other but, furthermore, it is the precondition for the other to become transparent to me as 'for who he is'.<sup>93</sup> John Caputo has argued that in this conception of interaction with alterity can be found 'an ethics of otherness' based on humility and compassion.<sup>94</sup> It is through such a liberating and disclosive concern that the self may recognize others in their own groundlessness.

As the 'ethical' self's disposition, liberating concern is able to penetrate a particular situation, even if this crosses the boundaries of another community. Similarly, it allows for the other to do the same because it involves the 'recognition of the claim of others who, from beyond "our" horizon, call into question the parochialism of our tradition insofar as it does not speak for them and who

demand that we include their perspectives in the effort to understand ourselves'.<sup>95</sup> Such a disposition:

. . . does not involve a subordination of self and others to a common standard that would provide a decision-procedure telling anyone what he ought to do in a particular situation; rather, it involves an attunement to the particularity of others, to others *as* truly other, stemming from an awareness of the singularity of one's own existence.<sup>96</sup>

This is not an impersonal and anonymous perspective but an 'interpersonal orientation motivated by one's desire not to incorporate others into "the universal" but, rather, to "let others be" in their freedom for their own possibilities and to allow one's self-understanding to be informed by theirs'.<sup>97</sup> The 'ethical' self implies the withdrawal of identity based solely on the nurturing *ethos* in which the self is primarily and initially socialized and thus can sustain 'a form of coexistence in which one remains attentive to others as centers of transcendence and possibility who are never subsumed by the public projects in which they happen to be absorbed'.<sup>98</sup> The 'ethical' self liberates the other, not by awarding him personhood and accompanying rights, but by calling him to face his own heteronomy and groundlessness.

For the discipline of international relations this discussion proposes the rethinking of cosmopolitanism from being reliant on legal instruments such as rights and claims about the universality of human nature towards cultivating a disposition of openness towards the other. This is a proposal that has conceptual merits and goes to the heart of debates about xenophobia, refugees, migration, etc. However, it is also a proposal which relies on affective and reflective discussion. In other words, it is not a direct replacement of proposals about international institutions and the internationalization of regimes. Indeed, it is a discussion which alerts us to the possibility of a different path towards global ethics. Furthermore, the attention paid to the questioning of ethics and the cultivating of a disposition towards the other through a reconsideration of how the other constitutes selfhood also means that global ethics is intimately related to our own continuous self-relationship. As such it cannot be fully achieved, in the sense of being instituted once and for all; rather, one struggles to maintain this questioning and struggles to be 'on the way to global ethics'.

## Conclusion

In considering the possibility and need for a global ethics, this article suggested a different path than that offered most prominently by the cosmopolitan political project. Even ethical theorists who strive for a 'thoroughgoing anti-foundationalist ethics', such as Molly Cochran, find that '[b]y definition, an ethic is understood to be universalizable'<sup>99</sup> in the sense that it is 'interested in seeking convergence on ethical principles'.<sup>100</sup> While recognizing that what exists in an era of globalization is a 'plea for universal morality', the article illustrated that ethics is contained within a prevalent communal *ethos* and ethical construction arising

within particularist locations, which in the case of international relations scholarship is mostly western. Seen in this light, the aspirations of universalist ethics are disclosed as particularistic drives of socialization, which seek to spread beyond their particularity. The linguistic trajectory of the word *ethos*, from which ethics is derived, showed it to arise through processes of habituation within distinct, customary ways of life and to be embedded within habitual and average behaviour. Analysed through Heidegger's discussion of average everydayness, ethics is revealed as implicated in the processes of socialization and conformity, which are nurturing and even constitutive for the self, yet which keep it within average comportment. The structure of *ethos*, it was argued, is closed off to the other and the articulation of global ethics might depend on calling one's *ethos* into question. The article explored Heidegger's account of silence and hearing as the 'conditions of audibility' of the other's voice and suffering, as well as the self's anxiety. Through the enhancement of such conditions, an 'ethical' selfhood is recovered which understands itself as opening to otherness.

In the end, however, the recovered 'ethical' self cannot provide a renewed foundation to fill the space left by the unworking of modern subjectivity, nor can its ethical self-relationship be universalized in any concrete sense. Yet this double prohibition is not a limitation for global ethics; rather, it has directed the present inquiry towards the articulation of a *disposition* or *sensibility* towards the other whose possibility might as yet exceed the 'ethicity' of ethics. Far from limiting the ability to respond to global concerns, the recovery of the 'ethical' self is but a different, more attuned, response to the plea of audibility from the other. This, moreover, has wide-ranging implications for the ethical discourses of IR in their efforts to confront and respond to the limitations of universalist and foundationalist inspirations in the current crisis of Enlightenment thought. As Linklater has noted in this regard, the conversation that IR ethical theories sustain with their critics open up the very possibility of 'a radically improved universalism'.<sup>101</sup> The turn to *disposition*, forms an affirmative path within the Enlightenment *ethos*, in which most international ethical theorizing is located; it is a response which heeds, more than ever, the desire to hear the voice of the other and witness its suffering, and pursue no ethical project which unwittingly obscures its very object of concern. For the ethical discourses of international relations, this could become a path in their efforts to work within the limits (not limitations) of Enlightenment thought, at its margins. Indeed, the turn to disposition is a response befitting an awareness of the limit, which abides by the 'destruction' of the modern subject by the phenomenological attentiveness to the facticity of existence. In this regard, the disposition of 'liberating' concern towards the other is also more than an expression of empathy for the other; it is a caring-for which calls the other to his own anxious Being-in-the-world and lets her assume her radical groundlessness. It is a letting be that could offer another kind of cosmopolitan attitude through which to begin the articulation of 'global ethics'.

## Notes

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1. Jeremy Waldron (2000) ‘What is Cosmopolitan?’, *Journal of Political Philosophy* 8(2): 227–43.
2. Ulrich Beck (2000) ‘The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity’, *British Journal of Sociology* 51: 79–105.
3. *Ibid.*, 83.
4. *Ibid.*, 84.
5. Charles E. Scott (1990) *The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger*, p. 4. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
6. In the literature of international relations this includes: David Campbell (1998) *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Vivienne Jabri (1998) ‘Restyling the Subject of Responsibility in International Relations’, *Millennium* 27: 591–611. There are also a number of relevant essays in the 1998 special issue on ethics, *Millennium* 27(3).
7. Martin Heidegger (1962) *Being and Time*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell. Henceforth cited in text as *BT* and the page number of this English edn.
8. Scott (n. 5), 106.
9. Additionally, in a Foucauldian argument, the process of habituation can be supplemented with the exercise of power beyond its traditional understanding as coercion, since ‘[i]n modern societies, power operates in a much more complex manner: through normalisation rather than prohibition’, in Andrew Schaap (2000) ‘Power and Responsibility: Should we Spare the King’s Head?’, *Politics: Surveys and Debates for Students of Politics* 20(3): 129–35, p. 129.
10. See John Haugeland (1982) ‘Heidegger on Being a Person’, *Nous* 16: 15–26.
11. Arguably, this is how conceptions of ‘mores’ and ‘morals’ converge. For a discussion of codification of rules in international politics, see Michael Dillon (1998) ‘Criminalising Social and Political Violence Internationally’, *Millennium* 27(3): 543–67.
12. Charles Chamberlain (1984) ‘From “Haunts” to “Character”’: The Meaning of Ethos and its Relation to Ethics’, *Helios* 11: 97–108, p. 97.
13. *Ibid.*, 99.
14. Scott (n. 5), 144–5.
15. Chamberlain (n. 12), 100.
16. *Ibid.*, 101.
17. Scott (n. 5), 143.
18. *Ibid.*, 144.
19. *Ibid.*, 145.
20. For the meaning and historical evolution of the term Dasein, see Theodore Kisiel (1993) *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, pp. 116–48, and 493. Berkeley: University of California Press.
21. For an account of the ‘they’ as shared historical practices, see Hubert L. Dreyfus (1991)

- Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*, p. 157. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. John Haugeland (1989) 'Dasein's Disclosedness', *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 28: 51–73 (The Spindel Supplement).
22. This is of course a misleading translation of the term *das Man* by Macquarrie and Robinson, which others have translated as 'the one' or even 'community'. For a discussion of the 'they', see E.C. Boedeker (2001) 'Individual and Community in Early Heidegger: Situating Das Man, the Man-Self, and Self-Ownership in Dasein's Ontological Structure', *Inquiry* 44: 63–100. Stephen Mulhall (1996) *Heidegger and Being and Time*. London: Routledge.
  23. For a discussion of average intelligibility see Richard Polt (1997) 'Metaphysical Liberalism in Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie*', *Political Theory* 25: 655–79. Hubert L. Dreyfus (2000) 'Could Anything Be More Intelligible than Everyday Intelligibility? Reinterpreting Division I of Being and Time in Light of Division II', in James E. Faulconer and Mark A. Wrathall (eds) *Appropriating Heidegger*, pp. 155–74. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  24. The assignment of value is but a sign of nihilism, see Martin Heidegger (1991) *Nietzsche*, tr. David Farrell Krell, vol. 4, p. 44. New York: Harper & Row. Martin Heidegger (1977) 'The Age of the World Picture', tr. William Lovitt, in Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, pp. 115–54. New York: Harper & Row.
  25. For another account of the customary and the ethical see Gernot Böhme (2000) 'Ethical Life or "The Customary"', tr. John Farrell, *Thesis Eleven* 60: 1–10.
  26. Ken Booth writes, however, '[t]o say that human rights come somewhere – and the West is not the only geographical expression claiming to be a parent – should never be allowed to be the end of the story: it is only a discussion of how we should live, as humans, on a global scale'. Ken Booth (1999) 'Three Tyrannies', in Timothy Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds) *Human Rights in Global Politics*, pp. 31–70, p. 53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  27. Even Andrew Linklater's universalist approach acknowledges this: 'A new universality may yet bring an end to the West's use of universalist moral concepts to celebrate the achievements of Western modernity and to enlarge its control of other peoples' see Linklater (1998) *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era*, p. 24. Cambridge: Polity Press. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that cosmopolitan theories are idealist in nature, and Linklater's recent formulation in *The Transformation of Political Community* is a case in point. This idealism can result in a critical perspective towards their own location of western liberalism while, at the same time, offering a critique of non-liberal practices. Put plainly, the idealism in cosmopolitan thinking strives for a better version of liberalism, one that wants to include the other. Yet, their reliance on legalist instruments and their universalizing attitude often renders them open to critiques of imperialism nonetheless.
  28. Scott (n. 5), 142.
  29. See also David Campbell and Michael Dillon (eds) (1993) *The Political Subject of Violence*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
  30. Scott (n. 5), 106.
  31. *Ibid.*, 107.
  32. For a discussion of the 'generation of ground', see Dreyfus (n. 21), 144, 155, and 157–62 and Martin Heidegger (1998) 'On the Essence of Ground (1929)', in William McNeill (ed and tr.) *Martin Heidegger: Pathmarks*, pp. 97–135. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  33. On suffering see Philip Allott (2000) 'Globalization from Above: Actualising the Ideal through Law', *Review of International Studies* (special issue on global ethics) 26: 76–7. The

- focus on suffering necessarily refers to a western conception of ethics and morality because the unworking of modern subjectivity for the purpose of exploring the ontological basis of coexistence is itself targeted towards the western conception of the subject. To call the modern subject 'western' might be redundant. See Etienne Balibar (1994) 'Subjection and Subjectivation', in Joan Copjec (ed.) *Supposing the Subject*, p. 14 n.12. London: Verso. Etienne Balibar (1991) 'Citizen Subject', in Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (eds) *Who Comes After the Subject?*, pp. 33–57. New York: Routledge.
34. Scott (n.5), 178.
  35. Of course, this is a rhetorical question given that such isolation is ontologically impossible given that the self is shared practices in its everydayness, see Dreyfus (n. 21).
  36. A fruitful term used by Mulhall (n. 22), 133.
  37. Rudi Visker (1999) *Truth and Singularity: Taking Foucault into Phenomenology*, p. 31 and footnote 14; brackets added. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. See also, Jacques Derrida (1984) *Otobiographies*. Paris: Galilée.
  38. Martin Heidegger (1996) *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit*, tr. Joan Stambaugh, p. 153. Albany: State University of New York Press.
  39. Miguel de Beistegui (1997) *Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias*, p. 149. London: Routledge.
  40. Ibid., 148.
  41. Ibid.
  42. Ibid., 148–9.
  43. Ibid., 149.
  44. Ibid., 150
  45. Jacques Derrida (1993) 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemog (Geschlecht IV)', in John Sallis (ed.) *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, p. 175. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
  46. Ibid., 164.
  47. Ibid., 174.
  48. Ibid., 164.
  49. Beistegui (n. 39), 149.
  50. Derrida (n. 45), 164.
  51. Beistegui (n. 39), 150.
  52. Derrida (n. 45), 174.
  53. Ibid., 176.
  54. Ibid.
  55. Ibid., brackets added.
  56. There are still objections to this by scholars influenced by Emmanuel Levinas's critique of Heidegger who claim that, despite the potentials of the analysis of the existential structures of Dasein, the ontological nature of this work prevents it from being useful to a discussion on ethics. In other words, the discussion remains about Dasein and not really about the other; the other is still too removed from this consideration. See, for example, Simon Critchley (1999b) *The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas*, 2nd edn. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Simon Critchley (1999a) *Ethics – Politics – Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas, and Contemporary French Thought*. London: Verso. Critchley's discussion of Nancy's *Being Singular Plural* (Jean-Luc Nancy (2000) *Being Singular Plural*, tr. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O'Byrne. Stanford: Stanford University Press) in the latter book is especially interesting as it contests Nancy's reliance on Dasein's otherness. However, this article wants to contend that inasmuch this ontological discussion has anything to say to ethics, it is through the move of deconstructing autonomous subjectivity. At the point of deconstruction, the ethical and

the ontological come together and enable a consideration of concrete otherness as well as heteronomous selfhood. This is further addressed in the following section 'Recovering the Ethical Self'.

57. Beistegui (n. 39), 151.
58. Scott (n.5), 111.
59. Ibid., 110; emphasis and brackets added.
60. Ibid., 217.
61. Francois Raffoul (1998) *Heidegger and the Subject*, tr. David Pettigrew and Gregory Recco, p. 226. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
62. 'Choice is at the heart of ethics, but our choices are never entirely free', see Michael Cox, Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (2000) 'Editors' Introduction to the Forum on *Social Theory of International Politics*', *Review of International Studies* 26: 1. The difference with the presupposition that choice always informs ethical decisions is that the recovery of the ethical self is not about this or that choice because these issues would be determined within the particular context. The recovery of the ethical self involves a 'turn away from ethics' in which customary moral practices are deconstructed.
63. See Walter A. Davis (1989) *Inwardness and Existence: Subjectivity in/and Hegel, Heidegger, Marx, and Freud*, p. 142. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
64. Ibid., 113.
65. Ibid.
66. See Martin Heidegger 'Letter on Humanism (1946)', in William McNeill (ed) (1998) *Martin Heidegger: Pathmarks*, p. 269. Cambridge: Cambridge University. Scott (n. 5), 143-7.
67. Ibid., 269.
68. Thus, 'ethicity' refers to 'the essence of ethics', see Robert Bernasconi (1997) 'Justice without Ethics?', *PLI: Warwick Journal of Philosophy* 6: 58-69. Jacques Derrida (1995) 'Passions: An Oblique Offering', tr. David Wood, in Jacques Derrida, *On the Name*, pp. 3-31. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
69. See Michel Foucault (1991a) 'Ethics and Politics: An Interview', tr. Catherine Porter, in Paul Rabinow (ed.) *The Foucault Reader*, p. 377. London: Penguin Books.
70. Michel Foucault (1991b) 'On the Genealogy of Ethics: Overview of Work in Progress', in Paul Rabinow (ed.) *The Foucault Reader*, p. 343. London: Penguin Books.
71. Jean-Luc Nancy (1996) 'Being-With', tr. Iain Macdonald, University of Essex, *Centre for Theoretical Studies Working Papers* 11: 1.
72. Scott (n. 5), 145.
73. Herman Philipse (1999) 'Heidegger and Ethics', *Inquiry* 42: 456.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., 468.
76. Linklater (n. 27), 48.
77. Nancy makes the connection between nothingness as the ground of Dasein and the deconstruction of 'certainty' as the ground of modern subjectivity quite explicit when he notes that '[a]ll of Heidegger's research into "being-for (or toward)-death" was nothing other than an attempt to state this: *I* is not – am not – a subject'. Jean-Luc Nancy (1991) *The Inoperative Community*, tr. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland and Simona Sawhney, p. 14. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Being-toward-death suggests not a biological end of Dasein but its radical contingency and groundlessness. 'Finitude is characterized by groundlessness (*Grund-lösigkeit*) or by the concealment of the ground (*Grund-verborgenheit*)', see Raffoul (n. 61), 234.
78. Jacques Derrida (1979) *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles/Éperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche*, tr. Barbara Harlow, English-French edn, p. 117. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

79. Derrida (n. 68), 11, emphasis added. Of course, the refusal of foundationalism involves its own universal claim about the 'universal questionability of philosophical grounds'. Horace L. Fairlamb (1994) *Critical Conditions: Postmodernity and the Question of Foundations*, p. 7. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
80. John van Buren (1992) 'The Young Heidegger, Aristotle, Ethics', in Arleen B. Dallery, Charles E. Scott and P. Holley Robert (eds) *Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought*, p. 178. Albany: State University of New York Press.
81. Martin Heidegger (1998) 'Comments on Karl Jasper's *Psychology of Worldviews* (1919/21)', in William McNeill (ed.) *Martin Heidegger: Pathmarks*, pp. 1–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, cited and tr. in van Buren (n. 80), 178.
82. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1992) 'The Political Incompetence of Philosophy', in Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis (eds) *The Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics*, p. 366. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. See Kai Nielsen (1966) 'Ethical Relativism and the Facts of Cultural Relativity', *Social Research* 33: 544.
86. Tzvetan Todorov (1989) *On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism and Exoticism in French Thought*, p. 32. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
87. Nielsen (n. 85), 545. This notion of a plea is slowly also being heeded in international ethical theorizing. See Ken Booth, for example, who articulates, it seems, a similar plea for universality: 'not because we are human, but to make us human' in Booth (n. 26), 52. Molly Cochran writes in a similar vein: 'There may be a hope for a principle to have a range of applicability, a degree of universality beyond the context of the situation from which it arises . . .'. Molly Cochran (1999) *Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach*, p. 206. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
88. Christopher Fynsk (1991) 'Foreword', in Nancy (n. 77), p. xiii.
89. Jean-Luc Nancy (1993) *The Experience of Freedom*, tr. Bridget McDonald, p. 68. Stanford: Stanford University Press. This singularity is different from individuality which 'equated identity with sameness', as argues Noël O'Sullivan (1997) 'Postmodernism and the Politics of Identity', in Kathryn Dean (ed.) *Politics and the End of Identity*, p. 234. Aldershot: Ashgate. Being singular only occurs in its concrete relation to others.
90. John D. Caputo (1993) *Demythologizing Heidegger*, p. 127. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
91. The earlier translation of *Being and Time* by Macquarrie and Robinson (n. 7) uses the word 'solicitude' but the later 1996 translation by Joan Stambaugh (n. 38) rightly uses 'concern' for the term *Fürsorge*, see p. 114.
92. Lawrence Vogel (1994) *The Fragile 'We': Ethical Implications of Heidegger's Being and Time*, p. 75. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
93. Ibid., 82.
94. John D. Caputo (1987) *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project*, pp. 258–9. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
95. Vogel (n. 92), 70.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid., 71. See also David Campbell and Michael Dillon (1993) 'The Political and the Ethical', in Campbell and Dillon (n. 29), 167–8.
98. Vogel (n. 92), 71. Yet, the question remains as to how this awareness of others as 'centers of transcendence' becomes manifested in actual relations with others – how is such an attunement to be manifested in the everyday world of praxis? The debate on this question is likely to remain important not only for scholars but increasingly with civil

society organizations which start to critique current institutions and policies and continue to reflect on the difficulty and deficiency of rights-based language. For example, in the World Summit at Johannesburg in Sept. 2002, the inability of international institutions and western publics to listen to the voices of others whose concerns are not expressed in the language of right and interest became more prominently debated than it had in the past. This is a debate that will continue to seek practical manifestations and the difficulty with providing easy answers is not a sign of its failure but rather a sign of its complexity.

99. Cochran (n. 87), 206.

100. *Ibid.*, 249.

101. Linklater (n. 27), 48.